Trader’s Narrative

By Mark Galasiewski
This article was originally published as a special Interim Report of EWI’s Asian-Pacific Financial Forecast on March 23, 2009. Since then the Sensex has risen as much as 65%. For a limited time, Elliott Wave International is offering a full 10-page issue of the Asian Pacific Financial Forecast, Discover The Bull Markets You’re Missing, free.

Prices in India’s Sensex have just broken above a downtrend line, imitating a pattern from 2004 that led to a strong rally. This interim report updates our wave count for India, since its wave pattern in particular may offer investors a rewarding long-term opportunity.

In the March 2009 issue of The Asian-Pacific Financial Forecast, we showed how pattern, price, time and sentiment considerations were pointing to the end of multi-month, five-wave declines in most major Asian-Pacific indexes by late March. In most cases, those lows have likely been achieved.

Although we have looked for a fifth wave down to below the October low in the Sensex, it has failed to materialize. That failure plus the recent sharp reversal rally prompts our return to an earlier wave count. The daily Sensex chart shows how the decline since the 2008 high can be counted as three waves. A three-wave decline opens the possibility of a rally back to near the 2008 highs. But there is reason to set our sights even higher.

Perhaps the best argument for a bull market in Indian stocks is the potential fractal relationship we identified in the November 2008 issue, published just four days after the October low. The weekly chart below is an updated version of the one we showed at that time. Here is our analysis from the November issue:

“The Wave Principle teaches that the stock market is a self-similar fractal. That means that some pieces of its price record—which Ralph Nelson Elliott called waves—resemble other pieces elsewhere in that record. The weekly chart of India’s Sensex shows just such an example.Notice how the up-down sequence labeled Intermediate waves (1) and (2) (in the small red box) is a microcosm of the larger up-down sequence from the 2003 low to the present (i.e., waves and , in the large black box). In both cases, the wave-two correction retraced approximately 50% of the wave-one advance. (We have calculated those retracements using the same logarithmic scale shown in the chart: logarithmic charting displays equal percentage moves proportionally).

“If we have identified this “nested fractal” relationship correctly, it means that Indian stocks are about to begin Primary wave of the bull market that began in 2003. Waves and lasted more than four times the duration of waves (1) and (2). If that same proportion holds going forward, the SENSEX may continue advancing for 15 years before reaching the end of wave.”

Since then, the analogy to the 2004 period (“The 2004 Analog”) has become even more interesting.

Just as then, prices have broken down from an apparent triangle, and then reversed and broken out above the downtrend line. In 2004, prices never looked back after the breakout. As long as prices do not fall back below the low of today’s breakout bar, we will assume that the 2003-2008 bull market will continue to provide a road map to the future of India’s stock market.

For more information emerging opportunities in Asian markets, download Elliott Wave International’s free 10-page issue of the Asian Financial Forecast.

Mark Galasiewski is the editor of Elliott Wave International’s Asian-Pacific Financial Forecast and member of EWI’s Global Market Perspective team covering Asian stock indexes.

Below is an article written by Mark Galasiewski, editor of Elliott Wave International’s Asian Financial Forecast. Although it uses Australian data to illustrate its point, the same can be shown with US central bank rates and short term T-Bill rates:

The following is excerpted from Elliott Wave International’s Global Market Perspective. The full 120-page publication, which features forecasts for every major world market, is available free until April 30. Visit Elliott Wave International to download it free.

Conventional wisdom says that central banks can influence or even direct financial markets and the macroeconomy. The very existence of Elliott waves challenges such assumptions. For if markets responded to every central bank directive, how could Elliott waves exist? Parallel trend channels, Fibonacci price relationships, the similarity of form between waves of different sizes and time periods—none of that would be possible. Central bank decisions would have to coincide perfectly with turning points in Elliott waves, and we know that just doesn’t happen. But even without using waves, we can expose the conventional wisdom for the fallacy that it is.

Take, for example, this assertion in a recent article in a U.K. economic weekly: “Part of the aim of central banks in driving down interest rates is to encourage a greater risk appetite among investors.” Two key assumptions underlie that statement: a) central banks determine interest rates; and b) lower interest rates can increase society’s appetite for risk.

To see how the first assumption is false, let’s take a look at the daily chart of Australian interest rate data. It duplicates a study that Elliott Wave International has often done with U.S. interest rate data. It shows how movements in the cash target rate set by Australia’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), appear to follow those in 3-month Australian Treasury Bills. After decisive moves up in T-bills from 2006 to early 2008, for example, the RBA faithfully raised its target. T-bills have since led the RBA during the financial crisis of the past year. In fact, the record indicates that the RBA almost always follows T-bills over time.

The proper conclusion to draw is not that the RBA has orchestrated the decline in rates since the early 1980s—but that it’s been riding it. During good times, central bankers look like geniuses; during bad times, they get tarred and feathered. Closer to the truth is that their interest-rate decisions are not proactive, but reactive, and that they continually follow in the footsteps of the market for lack of any other useful guide.

Now let’s look at the second assumption: that lower interest rates increase society’s appetite for risk. A simple glance at the weekly chart shows this assumption to be false. After the 1987 crash, the ASX All Ordinaries actually rallied for two years on rising rates and then sold off through 1990 on falling rates. Stocks then rose in 1991 on continued falling rates and sold off in 1992 on even lower rates. Continue following the chart to the right and you will see that there is no consistent correlation between the direction of interest rates and that of the stock market.

The myth of central bank potency is so pervasive that conventional analysts can’t even imagine a better explanation for price trends: that the market is the dog wagging its central bank tail, not the other way around.

For more information, download Elliott Wave International’s FREE issue of Global Market Perspective, available until April 30. The 120-page publication covers every major world market, global interest rates, international currencies, metals, energy and more.

Mark Galasiewski is the editor of Elliott Wave International’s Asian Financial Forecast and member of EWI’s Global Market Perspective team covering Asian stock indexes.