Last Thursday, Barry Ritholtz wrote in The Big Picture about two data points sent in by Doug Kass:
• The cash positions in mutual funds stand at 3.8%, slightly below the 3.9% low established in 1972.
• Margin debt as a percentage of the S&P market cap has climbed to 2.4%, an all-time high. The previous peak? Early 2000, at the height of the Internet bubble.
While Kass is a blisteringly smart guy, his penchant for the bearish side is well known. So to balance things out a bit I’d like to offer a few counter points delivered by Jason Goepfert from SentimenTrader.com
Mutual Fund Cash Positions
Since Goepfert won the 2004 Charles H. Dow award for his paper on mutual fund cash levels, he is a real authority on this topic. To read it, click on the Dow Award folder within the free trading resource box.
According to the paper, we have to normalize the mutual fund cash levels to account for varying interest rates over time. When interest rates are high, mutual fund managers have an incentive to maintain high cash levels because they are compensated for it. So Goepfert models the theoretical cash level for every interest rate point.
However, having normalized cash levels we still find that right now, mutual fund managers are holding about 3.38% less cash than they should be (theoretically for this interest rate level). It may not be that bearish though. For one, if we see a reduction in the Fed rate, it will reset this indicator. Also, a low cash level can be explained by structural changes in the mutual fund industry.
As indexing has grown, it has taken a larger and larger percentage of assets. Since by definition an index can not hold any cash, this can skew the data. But in reality it only reflects a trend towards indexing (and closet indexing).
Another possible explanation is that charters for mutual funds only allow the manager to hold a certain level of cash and in essence, forces them to invest the rest in equities. As well, with the implementation of new technologies, asset managers can now see fund flows in almost real time, allowing them to react quickly to redemptions and not requiring them to have a cash cushion.
To be totally honest though, while valid, these alternative explanations are rather weak. This indicator is quite accurate in the long term and because of that, it does bother me when I see it at such extreme. What Goepfert argues is that it may not be as extreme as it looks.
When NYSE margin debt overtook the 2000 levels, many bears made a huge deal out of it. However, this data point must not be taken so superficially.
Goepfert points out a little known statistic: apparently the NYSE not only keeps track of how much margin is being used within brokerage accounts but also how much available cash is there. It is important to note that these cash levels exclude the cash generated by short sales - so what is reported is cash that is owned, unrestricted by the account holder.
Interestingly, when we look at cash level, we see that, as a percentage of market capitalization, it is around 16% now. That’s double from 8% at the 2000 bubble top.
The point is that while margin debt relative to market capitalization is high now, investment account holders have in fact much more cash than they did during the top. This represents a huge amount of real buying power that can drive the market much higher as the cash is put to use.
That potential buying power simply was not there seven years ago.
This is classic Goepfert. He takes what is seemingly obvious, drills to the core, brings data and hard facts to bear and serves up real insight. Most people start out with a conclusion that ‘feels right’ and cling to the factoids that support their position.
I didn’t reproduce the graphs he provides but they are a thing of beauty. To see them, take a 14 day free trial. Trust me, you’ll stick around on day 15.
It doesn’t matter if you’re daytrading or watching the grass grow on your 401k, as long as you’re serious about making money in the market, Jason’s insights are a must.
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